Recent publications by members of the network

Stephan Hartmann:

  • Reutlinger, A., Hangleiter, D. and Hartmann, S. (forthcoming) Understanding (With) Toy Models. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • Hartmann, S., Psillos, S. & Frigg, R. (2017) How Does Philosophy of Science Make a Difference in the World We Live In?: A Conversation with Stephan Hartmann, Stathis Psillos, and Roman Frigg. Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 9(1): 79-82
  • Hartmann, S. (2016) Generalized Dicke States. Quantum Information and Computation, 16(15 & 16): 1333–1348
  • Hartmann, S. and Übler, H. (2016) Simulating Trends in Artificial Influence Networks. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 19(1): 2
  • Hartmann, S. and Colombo, M. (2015) Bayesian cognitive science, unification and explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science doi: 10.1093/bjps/axv036
  • David, R., Hartmann, S. and Sprenger, J. (2015) The No Alternatives Argument. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(1): 213-234
  • Hartmann, S. and Fitelson, B. (2015) A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence. Philosophy of Science, 82(4): 712-717
  • Hartmann, S. and Sprenger, J. (2012) Judgment aggregation and the problem of tracking the truth. Synthese, 187: 209-221

Erik Olsson:

  • Masterton, G. and Olsson, E.J. (2017) From Impact to Importance: The Current State of the Wisdom-of-Crowds Justification of Link-Based Ranking Algorithms, Philosophy & Technology, 1-17
  • Olsson, E.J. (2017) ‘Engel vs. Rorty on truth’, Synthese, 194(5): 1433-1450
  • Genot, E. & Olsson, E.J. (2017) Do we Trust Blindly on the Web? Iride: Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate. Iride:Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate
  • Olsson, E.J. (2017) Coherentism in the Epistemology of Memory. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
  • Olsson, E. J. and Proietti, C. (2016) Explicating Ignorance and Doubt: A Possible Worlds Approach. In Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw (eds.), The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Olsson, E. J. (2016) A naturalistic approach to the generality problem. In Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
  • Proietti, C., and Olsson, E. (2014) A DDL approach to pluralistic ignorance and collective belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43: 499-515
  • Vallinder, A. and Olsson, E. (2014) Trust and the value of overconfidence: A Bayesian perspective on social network communication. Synthese, 191(9): 1991-2007
  • Olsson, E. (2013) A Bayesian simulation model of group deliberation and polarization. In Bayesian Argumentation, ed. Frank Zenker, Berlin: Springer
  • Masterton, G, and Olsson, E.J. (2013) Argumentation and belief updating in social networks: a Bayesian approach. In Eduardo L. Fermé, Dov. M Gabby and Guillermo R. Simari (eds.), Trends in Belief Revision and Argumentation Dynamics. London: College Publications

Richard Pettigrew:

  • Pettigrew, R. (2017) The Principal Principle does not imply the Principle of Indifference, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. September 12
  • Pettigrew, R. (2017) Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree Synthese. September 14
  • Pettigrew, R, (2017) Précis and Replies to Contributors for Book Symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Episteme, 14: 1-30
  • Carel, H., Kidd, I.J. & Pettigrew, R. (2016) Illness as transformative experience. The Lancet, 388: 1152-1153
  • Pettigrew, R. (2016) Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘The Will to Believe’. Episteme, 13: 253-268
  • Pettigrew, R. (2016) On the accuracy of group credences. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Pettigrew, R. (2016) The population ethics of belief: in search of an epistemic Theory X. Noûs
  • Pettigrew, R. (2016) Accuracy and the laws of credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Pettigrew, R. (2016) Accuracy, risk, and the Principle of Indifference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1): 35-59
  • Pettigrew, R. (2016) Risk, rationality and Expected Utility Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5-6): 798-826.
  • Pettigrew, R. (2015) Accuracy and the belief-credence connection. Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(16): 1-20
  • Pettigrew, R. (2014) Accuracy, risk, and the principle of indifference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(2): 1-30
  • Pettigrew, R. (2013) What chance‐credence norms should not be. Noûs 47(3): 177-196
  • Pettigrew, R. (2012) Accuracy, chance, and the Principal Principle. Philosophical Review 121: 241-275

Jan-Willem Romeijn:

  • Romeijn, J. W. (forthcoming). Inherent Complexity: a problem for Statistical Model Evaluation.
  • Massimi, M., Romeijn, J.W. & Schurz, G. (2017) EPSA15 Selected Papers: The 5th conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Düsseldorf. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing
  • Peeters, H. and Romeijn, J. W. (2016) Epistemic Considerations About Uncertainty and Model Selection in Computational Archaeology: A Case Study on Exploratory Modeling. In Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis in Archaeological Computational Modeling. Springer International Publishing: 37-58
  • Wenmackers S. and Romeijn J. (2016) New theory about old evidence. A framework for open-minded Bayesianism. Synthese: an International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 193(4): 1225-1250
  • Romeijn, J., Morey, R.D. and Rouder, J.N. (2016) The philosophy of Bayes factors and the quantification of statistical evidence. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 72: 6–18
  • Romeijn, J. and Roy, O. (2015) Individual and social deliberation: Introduction. Economics and Philosophy, 31(1): 1-2
  • Romeijn, J. and Roy, O. (2014) Radical uncertainty: Beyond probabilistic models of belief. Erkenntnis, 79(6): 1221-1223
  • Romeijn, J. (2012) Conditioning and interpretation shifts. Studia Logica, 100(3): 583-606

Jan Sprenger:

  • Sprenger, J. and Stegenga, J. (forthcoming) Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures. Philosophy of Science
  • Colombo, M., Postma, M. and Sprenger, J. (2016) Explanatory Judgment, Probability, and Abductive Inference. In Papafragou, A., Grodner, D., Mirman, D., & Trueswell, J.C. (eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, 432-437
  • Sprenger, J. (2016) Confirmation and Induction. In Paul Humphreys (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Sprenger, J. (2016) The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 6(1): 173–189
  • Sprenger, J. (2016) Bayesianism vs. Frequentism in Statistical Inference. In Alan Hájek and Chris Hitchcock (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • David, R., Hartmann, S. and Sprenger, J. (2015) The No Alternatives Argument. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(1): 213-234
  • Sprenger, J. (2015) A novel solution to the problem of old evidence. Philosophy of Science, 82(3): 383-401
  • Klein, D. & Sprenger, J. (2015) Modelling individual expertise in group judgements. Economics and Philosophy, 31(1): 3-25

Kevin Zollman:

  • Zollman, K. (forthcoming) Learning to collaborate. In Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson, and Michael Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • Huttegger, S. and Zollman, K. (2016) The robustness of hybrid equilibria in costly signaling games. Dynamic Games and Applications, 6(3): 347-358
  • Kummerfeld, E. and Zollman, K. (2016) Conservativism and the Scientific State of Nature. British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 67(4): 1057-1076
  • Raeburn, P. and Zollman, K. (2016) How to win at christmas. New Scientist, 232(3104): 58-60
  • Rich, P. and Zollman, K. J.S (2016) Honesty through repeated interactions. Journal of theoretical biology, 395: 238-244
  • Raeburn, P. and Zollman, K. (2016) Can Kids Really Learn to Cooperate? Scientific American Mind, 27(2): 56-61
  • Huttegger, S., Bruner, J. and Zollman, K. (2015) The Handicap Principle is an Artifact. Philosophy of Science, 82(5): 997-1009
  • Kane, P and Kevin J.S. Zollman, K. (2015) An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling. PLoS ONE 10(9): e0137271. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0137271
  • Zollman, K. (2015) Modeling the social consequences of testimonial norms. Philosophical Studies 172(9): 2371-2383
Advertisements

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s